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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN  
SPACE AGENCY’S ACTIVITIES FOR THE SECURITY 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the activities of the European Space 
Agency (ESA) make a significant contribution to the security of the European Un-
ion. Initially, neither the ESA’s activities nor the original objectives for which it was 
established were connected with security issues. The ESA evolved from an interna-
tional intergovernmental organization focused on the exploration and use of space 
for peaceful purposes into a major player with a significant impact on the security 
of the EU. The presumption made by this paper is that in order for this evolution to 
be possible, both the ESA and the EU have had to go a long way to find common 
ground and forms of possible cooperation, preceded by the required political and 
programmatic changes. For the EU, which was relatively late in taking an inter-
est in space and its importance for security, space policy became a separate policy 
only under the Lisbon Treaty. At that time the EU granted to itself (shared) powers 
in this area. The paper will identify the most important reasons for and stages of 
this evolution, as expressed in policy documents. As this is still an ongoing proc-
ess, remaining obstacles to the optimal use of the potential of both organizations 
to strengthen the security of the European Union will be identified. The paper was 
created on the basis of the descriptive method, analysis of the content of documents 
and synthesis.
Since the beginning of the space age, space technologies have become very popu-
lar, to such an extent that today it is difficult to imagine our world without them. This 
applies to technologies used for both civilian and military purposes. Both the former 
and the latter serve, or may serve, to ensure security, but also may pose a serious 
threat, due to the increasing dependence of states and societies on space systems. 
There is a wide range of potential threats, from the possible use of anti-satellite 
weapons to hybrid operations and cyber-attacks that may disrupt or destabilize the 
functioning of the state. The contribution of European space systems as tools for 
the implementation of the Common Security and Defense Policy has been steadily 
increasing. As Europe faces ever-changing security threats that are more and more 
diverse, less predictable, and global in scope, the first line of response to crisis situ-
ations should already be outside of its borders. The space potential, in particular 
space assets and services, are priceless from the point of view of threat monitoring, 
early warning, surveillance, navigation and communication. It is therefore essential 
82	 Jolanta	BRYŁA	
for the European Union to ensure independent access both to outer space and to the 
technologies that provide the best opportunity for rapid assessment of the situation, 
quick decision-making and the effective conduct of operations. The European space 
infrastructure is expected to fulfill EU’s security related needs. This system of infor-
mation on the situation in outer space is known as the Space Situational Awareness 
(SSA). One also cannot overestimate the strategic importance of the space sector, 
which increases the security of countries developing it, as an instrument to support 
technological innovation. However, this aspect, as well as the impact of space policy 
on a full-scale pro-innovation policy accelerating the technological development of 
the economies of modern states and the importance of space policy will not be ana-
lyzed in this paper.
Countries with advanced space programs (the USA, Russia and China) make the 
most use of the space medium for security purposes, resulting, inter alia, in increased 
competition between them. However, while the US seeks to gain the advantage in 
space in order to ensure unhindered access to outer space in all circumstances, while 
at the same time being able to deprive its opponents of this opportunity (without ruling 
out the possibility of outer space weaponization in the future) (U.S. National, 1996: 
4; National Space Policy, 2006; National Space Policy, 2010: 14), Russia and China 
are more in favor of strengthening multilateral mechanisms to prevent the placement 
of weapons in space. Space policy and its objectives are reflected in the military/space 
strategies of these countries.
Against this background, the European Union emerged as a relatively young space 
player, with, however, significant potential and resources, as well as advanced space 
infrastructure. Despite the fragmentation of EU space activities between different 
agencies, organizations and individual countries, the EU also has shared interests in 
this field, progressively pursuing autonomy in its space programs (becoming inde-
pendent from both the US and Russia) (Dokument roboczy, 2008: 6), the prevention of 
the outer space weaponization, and the adoption of an international regime governing 
states’ activities in space (Bryła, 2015b). As the EU strives to obtain this status, the 
European Space Agency has a special role to play. While the ESA, by its very nature, 
from its very beginning has dealt with space, security issues were not part of its remit 
or field of interest. At the same time, the EU did not deal with space at all, with only 
some of its member states having national space programs. Therefore, for both entities, 
the need to adapt to new, rapidly changing needs and circumstances was both a politi-
cal and an organizational challenge.
The European Space Agency was founded with a Convention signed in Paris on 
May 30, 1975, following the merger of the European Space Research Organization 
(ESRO) and the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO). It is an in-
ternational, intergovernmental organization dedicated to implementing a joint Euro-
pean program for the exploration and exploitation of outer space. Its operations cover 
a wide range of activities, including astronautics (astronomy and astrophysics), Earth 
observation, telecommunications, navigation, manned and unmanned space flights, 
launchers and meteorology, as well as research and development in all these fields. Its 
activities also include supporting the development of modern and competitive industry 
in member states (Space security, 2016: 71).
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The activities of the ESA are aimed at expanding knowledge about the Earth and 
its immediate environment, the Solar System and the Universe, as well as developing 
space exploration technologies and promoting European industry, but also at enabling 
its economic exploitation. In addition, the organization coordinates the various objec-
tives of member states’ national space policies. While the Agency is fully independ-
ent, it does work closely with the European Union, alongside which it implements the 
main guidelines of the space strategy. The Agency’s main objectives are: to conduct 
activities on outer space research and exploitation for scientific purposes; to develop 
and implement a long-term European Space Policy, to make recommendations on the 
purposes of space activities and to coordinate national space policies; to coordinate the 
European Space Program with national programs and to integrate national programs 
into the European Program; to develop and implement an industrial policy in the space 
sector within the framework of its own programs; and to make recommendations for 
coherent policies in this field to member states (Convention, 2003: Article II).
The management of the ESA’s resources is based on the Geographical Return prin-
ciple, whereby industrial contracts are distributed in such a way that contracts with 
a value close to a country’s contribution to the ESA budget are placed with companies 
from that particular country (the rate of return on a contribution is around 90%). This 
is to encourage countries to allocate more resources to this purpose than they would 
have done otherwise. The Agency operates in a flexible manner, so that it can meet the 
expectations and needs of member states. Some countries are interested in carrying out 
large-scale activities (e.g. France and Italy), while others, for various reasons (e.g. dif-
ferent political priorities, lack of sufficient resources, etc.), participate in the Agency’s 
programs to a more limited extent.
The ESA runs two types of programs: mandatory and optional. All member states 
are obliged to participate in the mandatory programs, which are financed by the in-
dividual member states’ contributions in proportion to their gross domestic product 
(GDP). This includes, inter alia, space exploration and the construction and use of 
equipment for space exploration. Optional programs are financed by the participat-
ing countries. Participation is determined in negotiations on a program-by-program 
basis. The scope of the optional programs is not clearly defined. Optional programs 
are related to, among others, observation of the Earth and objects in its vicinity, tel-
ecommunications, satellite navigation, and space transportation. They also include the 
development of a European space launcher and programs for practical applications of 
space technologies (Europejska, 2017). The ESA does not seek to carry out operational 
activities – once the systems have been developed to a level at which they can enter 
the practical application phase, the Agency hands them over to related organizations 
which are responsible for maintaining, operating and developing the systems further 
(often in cooperation with the ESA), and for running an appropriate commercial pol-
icy. These organizations include Arianespace, which is responsible for the use of the 
Ariane launcher, Eutelsat, which is responsible for telecommunications, and Eumetsat, 
which is responsible for meteorological satellites.
In the case of space activities, science, technology and security are closely inter-
twined, while space technologies often have dual civilian/military applications. Deci-
sions on how to use outer space are therefore political in nature, which has an indi-
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rect impact on international peace and security. The example of many countries so far 
shows that the security sector is the most prolific user of satellite systems, often even 
determining the direction of their development. Technologies created and developed 
for the military sector in due course find civilian applications, e.g. Earth observation 
techniques, related to the development of aviation, or GPS satellite navigation (Sektor, 
2017).
The relationship between space and security is becoming increasingly important as 
most of the data and information used in the military and security sector is provided 
by space systems. As underlined by the European Commission in its document EU 
Space	 Industrial	Policy	Releasing	 the	Potential	 for	Economic	Growth	 in	 the	Space	
Sector, “these systems and services guarantee the independence and security of the 
EU” (Communication, 2013: 3). Developing space potential helps to improve both the 
external and internal security of the European Union. The demand for satellite services 
for military and security applications has increased in recent decades due to the grow-
ing participation of European military and security forces in foreign expeditionary 
missions (operations in Afghanistan and Libya, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, 
as well as humanitarian missions under the Common Security and Defense Policy, 
etc.). On the other hand, elements of existing space infrastructure are vulnerable to 
destruction or damage caused both by natural phenomena and by man-made objects 
(deliberate or unintended). Only a few countries have the technology to respond to 
some of these threats, and the lack of EU coordination mechanisms for such endeavors 
makes the protection of EU space infrastructure highly dependent on the resources and 
goodwill of non-EU countries (Bryła, 2015a).
As the emerging threats are not purely military in nature, they cannot be countered 
or combated by military means alone. Space technologies can support security in terms 
of both risk management and dealing with emerging threats. The EU wants to be able 
to act at all stages: risk prevention, early warning, crisis management, and helping vic-
tims of disasters. Space assets can provide the necessary flexibility to respond, thanks 
to satellites dedicated to telecommunication (communication), navigation (position-
ing) and electronic intelligence (reconnaissance and surveillance). Once in orbit, these 
systems become critical infrastructure that requires full protection against both delib-
erate and unintended threats. The objective of achieving ‘security in space’ can only 
be attained by developing a Space Situation Awareness to track possible threats to both 
space assets and ground systems. In order to guarantee both ‘security from space’ and 
‘security in space’ and to develop European and national space policies, it is essential 
to have the autonomous capability to send objects into space. In this regard, the EU is 
working hard to make itself independent from the US and Russia.
The initial lack of involvement of the ESA in security and defense matters (as pro-
vided for in its Statute) in recent years has been giving way to ever closer cooperation 
with the EU in this field. The Agency has created a legal framework to cope with its 
increasing security requirements, is increasingly involved in ensuring cyber-security 
and, together with the European Defense Agency (EDA) and the European Commis-
sion, is developing ways to strengthen its strategic independence in the field of critical 
space technologies. However, before the ESA became an important part of the network 
of actors responsible for various aspects of security in the European Union member 
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states, it had to find a formula in which the above could be performed by an inter-
national intergovernmental organization which, in principle, should deal exclusively 
with matters of science and space exploration for peaceful purposes. The European 
Union, in turn, had to integrate outer space into its security policy.
What follows describes the key phenomena and events that triggered the process of 
rapprochement of these actors, and the documents that reflected it.
I. The dynamic changes taking place in the security environment of the Europe-
an Union, including the emergence of new phenomena identified by its members as 
threats, led gradually to them being reflected in EU documents. A change in the nature 
of many threats, and the emergence of diverse new ones (internal and external, re-
gional and global, civilian and military, natural and man-made), required, first of all, 
the precise identification of these threats, followed by the development of strategies to 
counter them, and the gathering of the necessary tools to counteract them. The evolu-
tion of the main strategic documents related to the security of the European Union 
reflected the process of these changes.
The European Security Strategy of 2003 takes a broad approach to security. Objec-
tives arising from this strategy include peacekeeping operations, protection of critical 
infrastructure and common external borders, prevention of the proliferation of weap-
ons, and verification of agreements (Dokument roboczy, 2008: 2). While this strat-
egy identifies five key threats, i.e. terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, regional conflicts, the collapse of statehood, and organized crime (Euro-
pean	Strategy, 2003), in 2008 cybersecurity, energy security and climate change were 
added (Czachór, 2010: 32). By 2010, cybercrime, cross-border crime, violence itself, 
and natural and man-made disasters were added to the list of key threats (Strategia	
bezpieczeństwa, 2010: 13–14). In 2015, terrorism, cross-border crime and cybercrime 
were again among the priorities (Europejska	agenda, 2015: 2). With the evolution of 
the landscape of threats, in the new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy 
of 2016 the list was expanded to include hybrid challenges and threats, and manage-
ment of external borders (Wspólna	wizja,	wspólne	działanie, 2016: 7). Such a wide 
range of global challenges and catalogs of threats requires a diversified set of instru-
ments and response capabilities. The European Union has long considered the capacity 
to respond comprehensively to security threats a priority, recognizing that complex 
and interdependent challenges require action on multiple levels, and, in the longer 
term, the management of crises and efforts to address their root causes.
II. The growing importance of outer space for national politics, economies and 
security has resulted in the need to protect the EU’s space assets. In today’s security 
environment, which is characterized by an increase in unconventional threats (terror-
ism, cross-border organized crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), 
countries need to be aware of what is happening in their immediate and more dis-
tant environment, and remain capable of acting effectively. This would be impossible 
without the extensive use of satellite techniques, starting with satellite observation, 
through the monitoring of borders and international developments, to early warnings 
about non-typical phenomena or activities and techniques supporting foreign missions, 
improving command capabilities, or facilitating data collection and analysis. The in-
creasing use of satellite techniques in rescue operations and crisis management is also 
86	 Jolanta	BRYŁA	
important. As a result, outer space is inevitably becoming another area of international 
struggle, as are the areas of land, sea, air and cyberspace.
III. For the European Communities, and subsequently for the EU, space has re-
mained for a very long time exclusively the domain of research and scientific develop-
ment, with little political relevance. Only new trends, both qualitative and quantitative, 
which emerged with the end of the Cold War have forced this approach to change. 
Space systems have begun to be perceived as powerful tools to achieve a wide range of 
objectives in different fields of security (economic, social and environmental). At the 
same time, the number of countries and commercial actors involved in space activities 
has increased, while new applications have proven to go far beyond the achievement of 
political objectives characteristic of the Cold War period. In an effort to increase the se-
curity of its members by becoming independent from external actors (notably the US) 
in terms of space infrastructure, the EU has been systematically developing its own, 
which paradoxically makes it more sensitive and vulnerable to threats, increasing the 
demand for the protection of space assets. This is even more important as, at the same 
time, the economic dependence of EU citizens on space services is also increasing. De-
spite the above, for a long time, most EC/EU security documents have not highlighted 
the link between security and space, and the strategic, political and military importance 
of space practically has not been taken into account at all. Rather, the focus has been 
on scientific programs in space and civilian applications which are within the scope of 
the ESA. The European Union itself did not have any jurisdiction over space activi-
ties. The gradual shift taking place in this area is best illustrated by the evolution of the 
content of the main strategic documents relating to EU security.
IV. In the next phase, the EC/EU started to integrate space into its policies and 
documents (programmatic evolution) and assigned itself powers related to space and 
space policy. While cooperation in the field of space policy in Europe has been ongo-
ing since the 1960s, it is only since the 1980s that the European institutions have be-
gun to adopt key documents contributing to the development of a coherent European 
space policy. One of the first of these documents was issued by the Commission of the 
European Communities on July 26, 1988, on a common approach to the field of space. 
Since then, the Communities’ political and legal aquis has been steadily growing, dem-
onstrating the growing interest of the European institutions in matters of outer space. 
This was reflected, inter alia, in the adoption of a number of important documents 
defining the framework for the joint space activities of the two organizations. The most 
important of these are specified below.
1. Communication of the European Commission of 27 September 2000 Europe and 
Space:	Turning	 to	 a	 new	 chapter, announcing the creation of a coherent European 
space policy (Europe, 2001).
2. Council	Resolution	of	16	November	2000	on	a	European	space	strategy (Council, 
2000). Under the above, on March 2, 2001, the EU and ESA established the Joint Task 
Force (JTF) on the European Strategy for Space, which implemented the guidelines of 
the strategy, such as increasing the use of space potential to benefit for the market and 
industry. The document also highlights the importance of ensuring Europe’s independ-
ent access to space for its political position on the international scene. The resolution 
sets out two main lines of action for the EU: the development of the European satel-
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lite navigation system Galileo, and work on the development of an independent Earth 
observation system (GMES).
3. A document adopted by the European Commission on December 7, 2001 enti-
tled Towards	a	European	space	policy. The European Commission and the European 
Space	Agency	 Joint	 Task	 Force	 report	 (Towards, 2002), in which the Commission 
stressed the need to integrate the space sector into a broader pan-European political 
and economic strategy. The EU has recognized that, given the wide range of potential 
applications, space activities should be the subject of a separate policy.
4. In response to the European Parliament’s demand, voiced in July 2002, for 
a White Paper on Space, the European Commission, in cooperation with the ESA, 
published a groundbreaking document in 2003 – Green	Paper.	European	Space	Policy	
(Green, 2003). The Paper provides an overview of the top space policy issues devel-
oped jointly by the Commission and the ESA within the Joint Task Force framework 
since 2001. Particular emphasis is placed on the need to raise awareness of the stra-
tegic and political importance of space for the EU, and to launch a debate on space 
policy involving all stakeholders.
5. In November 2003, the European Commission published the White Paper. Space: 
a	new	European	frontier	for	an	expanding	Union.	An	action	plan	for	implementing	the	
European Space policy (White, 2003). This document defined the areas of EU space 
activity and postulated expenditure related to different scenarios. It was preceded by 
a several-year-long debate on whether the EU (unlike the ESA) should take a leading 
role in the development of a European space policy. Space was identified as strategi-
cally important for the independence of the European Union, the creation of new jobs, 
and competitiveness. In order to achieve its objectives, the EU had to develop and 
implement its own space policy. Space activity was inscribed into the emerging Con-
stitution for Europe.
6. The need for closer cooperation between the European Space Agency and the 
European Union led to the conclusion of a Framework Agreement. In 2003, the ESA 
initiated work on Space and Security Policy in Europe as part of its General Studies 
Program. However, the evolution of the Common Foreign and Defense Policy and 
the European Security and Defense Policy required a more integrated approach to 
security. To this end, the European Union and the European Space Agency agreed to 
strengthen their contacts by signing a Framework Agreement in 2004 (Framework, 
2004), on the basis of a decision of the Council. The two organizations sought to 
establish a coherent space policy that would meet Europe’s needs and aspirations, 
and strengthen its position in the world. The aim of the space policy was to ensure 
the development of industry and scientific research, and the best possible use of the 
opportunities offered by space technologies to strengthen the competitiveness of the 
European economy.
7. The development of a single EU space policy required the setting of priorities. 
Therefore, in 2005, the European Commission came to the conclusion that space was 
becoming “a key element of the EU’s top policies” (Communication, 2005: 5). As 
a result, more attention was given to the security of the space environment, while 
space assets themselves acquired strategic importance as vital tools of the military and 
economic power of states, requiring protection.
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8. The EU’s growing interest in space increased the need for the development of 
a comprehensive space policy. As a result, the European Union, the European Space 
Agency, and member states jointly developed a European Space Policy, which was 
the culmination of a long process reflecting the growing cooperation between these 
actors. On May 22, 2007, the Space Council (i.e. the ESA Council of Ministers and 
the EU Competitiveness Council, meeting jointly) approved a resolution establishing 
a European Space Policy (Communication, 2007). The document aimed to unify and 
harmonize the work of the two organizations, and also to set strategic objectives for the 
EU’s future space activities, defining its priorities and key functions. The basic prin-
ciples of the European Space Policy were set out in a Resolution of the Space Council 
(Archiwum, 2007). The previous separate programs were combined, with the assump-
tion that satellite technologies for defense would be used for civilian purposes. It was 
underlined that the space sector is a strategic resource, contributing to Europe’s inde-
pendence and security. Recognizing that space technologies often have both civilian 
and defense applications, the document’s authors recommended stronger coordination 
of defense and civilian space programs, particularly in the field of security. The impor-
tance of the European Space Policy also lies in the fact that it is the first fully-fledged 
joint document on all dimensions of space activities, developed and adopted after ex-
tensive consultation with EU and ESA member states, as well as industry representa-
tives and other stakeholders, and endorsed by member states. The legal basis for the 
European Space Policy is laid down in Article 189 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU), which gives the EU powers shared with member states 
on space matters. This has allowed the EU to present two flagship programs, namely 
GMES/Copernicus (Global	Monitoring	 for	 Environment	 and	 Security) and Galileo	
(Gruszczak, 2014: 99–100). According to Article 189, in order to promote scientific 
and technological progress, industrial competitiveness, and the implementation of its 
policies, the EU will develop a European space policy, promote joint initiatives, sup-
port research and technological development, and coordinate the efforts necessary for 
the exploration and exploitation of space. In this way, the EU and ESA created a politi-
cal and legal framework for cooperation in the field of space policy, which is defined 
by the conventions, treaties, and documents of both intergovernmental organizations.
9. Since 2007, the EU, ESA and their member states have also been increasingly in-
volved in political and diplomatic initiatives for space security and the idea of sustain-
able development of the space environment, inter alia through the EU’s proposal to 
establish an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, (ICoC) (Bryła, 
2015b). Its objective is to improve the security and stability of operations in space, to 
build trust between space actors, and to reduce the formation of space debris.
10. In July 2008, the European Parliament adopted the Resolution of 10 July 2008 
on Space and security (European, 2008), underlining the importance of space potential 
for EU security and the fact that the European Space Policy should not contribute to 
the militarization and weaponization of outer space.
11. In September 2008, a Resolution of the Space Council identified space and se-
curity as one of the four new EU priorities, underlining the important contribution of 
the space medium to CFSP/ESDP and the security of European citizens (Commission, 
2008).
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12. A breakthrough in the evolution of the role of the ESA as an important actor 
for the security of the EU was the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, 
establishing space policy as a separate EU policy (Treaty, 2007: Art. 2c.3). Under this 
Treaty, the European Union, for the first time ever, obtained specific powers (shared 
between the EU and its member states) on space matters (Treaty	on	the	Functioning, 
2007: Art. 4.3). Since then, one of the aims of the European Space Policy has been 
the integration of space activities into other EU policies, including transportation and 
environmental protection.
13. A further step towards closer cooperation between the EU and ESA was the 
European Space Program developed in 2012, forming an integrated plan defining the 
type of activities, roles and responsibilities of participants, sources of funding and 
basic principles for its implementation. The body supervising this process is the Space 
Council. The purpose of the Program is to, inter alia, ensure Europe’s independence in 
space-based activity in strategically important areas (such as satellite launch capabili-
ties and satellite observation capabilities). Thus it can be expected that the ESA will be 
involved in an increasing range of space security functions.
V. The European Space Policy has transformed to take into account evolving se-
curity needs and, alongside this, the scope of the ESA’s activities is changing. The 
ESA’s impact on EU security increased following the launch of the European Frame-
work Cooperation (EFC) on civil protection, security and space-related research by the 
European Defense Agency (EDA) in 2009. The purpose of the EFC is to coordinate 
research investments by the EDA, the European Commission and the European Space 
Agency, with particular focus on dual-use areas for civil security and military users, in 
order to avoid the duplication of research and to save resources. Examples of the EDA 
and ESA working together on space projects are the Multinational	Space-based	Imag-
ing	System	(MUSIS) and a satellite-based data transfer system (Mazurek, 2012: 69). 
The 2011 EU Space Strategy identified the benefits of space technology and acknowl-
edged that space infrastructure was both a security tool and a critical resource that had 
to be protected. Services in the area of security obtained from observation, navigation 
and communication satellites require seamless space security and system stability. It is 
therefore necessary to take appropriate measures to eliminate the threat to those assets 
and the environment in which they operate.
VI. The year 2016, after a longer break, abounded in documents important for the 
development of cooperation between the EU and ESA, including in relation to secu-
rity. In November 2016, at the request of ESA and EU member states, both organiza-
tions presented a common vision and long-term objectives for the European space 
sector. These were subsequently confirmed by the Council of the ESA and the Council 
of the European Union as a focus of future cooperation. Both the common vision and 
the objectives took into account the importance of independent space technologies and 
policies for the security of the EU (Wspólna, 2016). What was highlighted as crucial 
was ensuring European autonomy in accessing and exploiting space as a secure envi-
ronment, and in the protection of its own infrastructure. A month earlier, the European 
Commission announced a Space Strategy for Europe – the first document since 2011 
setting out the objectives, assumptions and main development directions of European 
space policy (Frankowski, 2016). It underlined the importance of relations between 
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the EU and ESA to effectively meet its objectives, taking into account the Agency’s 
technical resources, professional expertise, technical capability and know-how (Com-
munication, 2016).
VII. However, in order for the ESA to contribute more effectively to the security of 
the EU in the future, it will be necessary to overcome the obstacles which hinder co-
operation between the two organizations, given that the main areas of activity of these 
organizations are different; for the ESA, space is the focus of its activity, while, for the 
EU, not only is space one priority among many, but additionally, the EU’s powers and 
capabilities are shared with its member states. A number of difficulties related to the 
above are highlighted in the 2012 Communication from the European Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament on the establishment of appropriate relations 
between the EU and ESA (Communication, 2012). This document identifies the fol-
lowing structural obstacles in the current relationship between the EU and ESA:
1. Incompatibility of financial regulations; the European Union and the ESA oper-
ate under different rules, which must coexist within the ESA. The funding for projects 
implemented by the EU is based on the principle of competitiveness, whereas the ESA 
does so on a geographical return basis. This generates problems, especially in the case 
of space programs which are co-funded by the ESA and the EU.
2. Asymmetric membership; the EU and ESA differ in membership, with the Eu-
ropean Union having 28 member states while the European Space Agency comprises 
21 EU member states and Switzerland. This means that not all ESA member states are 
members of the European Union or NATO at the same time. For example, Switzerland 
– a founding member of and active participant in the European Space Agency – is not 
member of the European Union, nor are Canada and Norway (ESA members). Con-
versely, not all EU members are ESA members – Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia are currently aspiring to join the organization. The cur-
rent voting system, whereby each member state has one vote in the ESA Council, 
while key decisions are adopted unanimously, gives disproportionate influence to the 
non-EU members of the ESA on important EU issues, including security matters.
3. Asymmetry in security and defense issues; as the EU increases its capabilities in 
security and defense matters, following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU faces 
the task of strengthening the links between the civil and defense dimensions of activ-
ity in space. However, the fact that ESA members include not only non-EU but also 
neutral states complicates efforts to formulate a space policy around common security 
objectives for the EU. Neutral states in particular are very cautious about the potential 
military use of space.
4. The lack of policy coordination mechanisms; the 2004 Framework Agreement 
between the EU and ESA is not sufficient in terms of coordinating activities. The de-
tails must be negotiated on a case-by-case basis, as there is no political mechanism to 
ensure consistency between ESA activities and other fields of EU policy. This makes 
longer and complicates the implementation of any program.
5. The ESA’s lack of political accountability (it does not report to the EP); one po-
tential solution to this problem is the ‘absorption’ of the Agency by the EU. However, 
the EU Competitiveness Council in 2014 withdrew from the idea of transforming the 
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organization, with legal personality in member states. The Council shared the Euro-
pean Commission’s view that “transforming the ESA into an EU agency would require 
a political consensus that would be difficult to achieve in the foreseeable future” (Bar-
tkowiak, 2014).
What should be added to this catalog of problems hindering cooperation between 
the ESA and the EU on matters of security are certain legal aspects of the operation of 
the ESA. Although neither the EU, as an international law entity (Polkowska, 2011), 
nor the ESA, as an organization, can accede to any of the five international treaties 
regulating space activities, the European Space Agency has formally notified the UN 
Secretary-General that it will respect the rights and obligations arising from the ap-
plication of two of the five outer space treaties, i.e. the Convention on Registration of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1975 and the Convention on International Li-
ability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 1972 (texts: United, 2002). As a result, 
although the EU owns and operates satellites, the satellites are registered by the ESA 
under the Convention of 1975.
However, perhaps the most important challenge facing the ESA, if it is to contribute 
to the security of the EU in a rapidly changing environment, is to strike a balance be-
tween the civilian and military use of space. This is necessary in view of the inevitable 
need for the Agency to go beyond its statutory objectives of “providing for and promot-
ing exclusively peaceful cooperation between European States” (Convention: Article II). 
The requirement for the peaceful nature of the pursued objectives significantly restricts 
the ESA’s activities promoting security. Therefore, in order to avoid any ensuing com-
plications, the term ‘peaceful’ is increasingly interpreted as ‘non-offensive’ rather than 
‘non-military,’ thus opening the door to dual (civilian-military) activities. This trend 
seems unavoidable, as shown by the example of the Ariane launch vehicles, which not 
only are created with the use of military technology but are also used to launch military 
satellites. Many of the EU’s security functions are carried out with the help of satellites 
(border monitoring, intelligence gathering and, in the event of an armed conflict, the pro-
vision of the necessary intelligence to its own forces), which are part of the infrastructure 
developed for the Copernicus program, even though it was designed as a strictly civilian 
tool. Currently, most of the technologies used have dual applications.
There is no doubt that the ESA is now essential for the strengthening of European 
security and defense, as it enables independent access to space, the development of in-
dustrial infrastructure, ground infrastructure, and many key technologies and services 
for data collection, processing and dissemination. This is of fundamental importance 
for all types of EU actions and activities related to security matters. Any disruption 
of the availability and operation of space-based systems might have negative conse-
quences for the security of EU member states. The ESA is also one of the few space 
agencies in the world which carries out activities in almost all fields of space activ-
ity (space science, space exploration, Earth observation, rockets, navigation, develop-
ment of space technologies and their applications, telecommunications, manned space 
flights). Each of them is directly or indirectly connected with security, in the broadest 
sense of the term. The ESA, together with some national space agencies in Europe, 
and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) is also 
involved in activities to control space debris orbiting close to the Earth which poses 
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a threat to space infrastructure. Nevertheless, it has to be said that the EU’s invest-
ments in defense-only space activities remain relatively low compared to the leading 
space powers. Out of all the EU member states, only France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and the United Kingdom have prioritized the development and ownership of defensive 
space programs. It can therefore be expected that the increased importance of ESA 
activities for the security of the EU will depend not only on the political will of the 
members of both organizations and the resources available, but also on the interests 
of the main investors in and beneficiaries of the programs carried out by the ESA, i.e. 
France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain.
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ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to show that the activities of the European Space Agency contribute 
significantly to the security of the European Union. What was required to develop space potential 
and to start using it for security purposes was the political and programmatic evolution of both 
organizations. The original objectives for which the European Space Agency was established were 
not related to security. Before the ESA became an organization with important implications for 
the security of the EU, it was an intergovernmental organization exclusively dedicated to the ex-
ploration and exploitation of space for peaceful purposes. The paper assumes that in order for this 
evolution to be possible, both the ESA and the EU had to find and/or develop common platforms 
and forms of possible cooperation. The paper identifies the most important reasons for and stages 
of this evolution, as expressed in program documentation. As this process is not yet complete, the 
remaining obstacles to the optimal use of the potential of both organizations to strengthen the se-
curity of the European Union are identified. The paper was created on the basis of the descriptive 
method, analysis of the content of documents and synthesis.
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ZNACZENIE DZIAŁALNOŚCI EUROPEJSKIEJ AGENCJI KOSMICZNEJ  
DLA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ 
 
STRESZCZENIE
Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, że działalność Europejskiej Agencji Kosmicznej w istotny spo-
sób przyczynia się do bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. Aby rozwinąć potencjał kosmiczny 
i zacząć wykorzystywać go do celów bezpieczeństwa niezbędna była ewolucja polityczna i pro-
gramowa obu organizacji. Oryginalne cele, dla realizacji których powołano Europejską Agencję 
Kosmiczną, nie miały związku ze sprawami bezpieczeństwa. Zanim ESA stała się podmiotem 
mającym istotny wpływ na bezpieczeństwo Unii Europejskiej była międzynarodową organiza-
cją międzyrządową zajmującą się wyłącznie badaniem i wykorzystaniem przestrzeni kosmicz-
nej do celów pokojowych. W artykule przyjęto założenie, że aby ta ewolucja była możliwa, za-
równo ESA, jak i UE musiały znaleźć i/lub wypracować wspólne płaszczyzny i formy możliwej 
współpracy. Zidentyfikowane zostaną najważniejsze przyczyny i etapy tej ewolucji znajdujące 
wyraz w dokumentach programowych. Proces ten nie został jeszcze zakończony, więc wska-
zane zostaną też istniejące nadal przeszkody utrudniające optymalne wykorzystanie potencjału 
obu organizacji dla wzmocnienia bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. Artykuł powstał w oparciu 
metodę opisową, analizę zawartości dokumentów oraz syntezę.
 
Słowa kluczowe: Europejska Agencja Kosmiczna, Unia Europejska, bezpieczeństwo Unii Eu-
ropejskiej
